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ABSTRACT
The fundamental goal of all good design and engineering is
to create maximal value added for any given investment.
There are many dimensions in which value can be assessed,
from monetary profit to the solution of social problems.
The benefits sought are often domain-specific, yet the logic
is the same: design is an investment activity.  Software
economics is the field that seeks to enable significant
improvements in software design and engineering through
economic reasoning about product, process, program, and
portfolio and policy issues.  We summarize the state of the
art and identify shortfalls in existing knowledge.  Past work
focuses largely on costs, not on benefits, thus not on value
added; nor are current technical software design criteria
linked clearly to value creation.  We present a roadmap for
research emphasizing the need for a strategic investment
approach to software engineering. We discuss how
software economics can lead to fundamental improvements
in software design and engineering, in theory and practice.
1 INTRODUCTION
The long-term exponential advance in computing and
communications device capabilities is beginning to enable
the incorporation of high-speed, low-cost, distributed
information processing into technology components and
system of all kinds, at all scales.  This trend promises to
provide enormous benefits by providing new functions and
by improving the performance of existing functions. The
potential for value creation is seen to be so great that it is
driving information machinery into essentially all major
social, business, and military human-machine systems:
appliances, homes, communities, industries, research,
design, armies.
Although hardware device innovation is the catalyst, it is
software that embodies new value added functions.
Software—broadly construed as any representation of
abstract information content of a computing machine,
whether encoded in fixed circuits or in the state of a
mutable device—thus takes on a critical level of economic
and social importance.  This role is reflected in demand that
far outstrips our production capacity [57], in world-wide
expenditures on software now estimated at US$800 billion
annually [13], and in many other aspects of the modern
economy.
Yet, as the importance of software grows, its production
and use remain among the most complex and problematical
aspects of modern technology development.  The
symptoms are clear.  One of many symptoms is that large
projects fail at an alarming rate.   The cost of failed projects
has been estimated at $85 billion for U.S. business in 1998
alone, for example [16].
Project, program and business failures are inevitable, even
desirable, in a dynamic marketplace.  However, software
development and use destroy value and create exposure to
risks unpredictably and at an unacceptable rate. Doomed
projects often consume considerable value before being
cancelled. Software costs jump in ways inconsistent with
expected risk, as exemplified by the experience of Garlan et
al., in what appeared to be a straightforward integration
task [30].  Delays lead to lost value, quality shortfalls, and
missed opportunities.  Unexpected absences of critical
properties make costly systems unusable. Our inability to
effectively manage the risk-return characteristics of
software is a serious and difficult problem.
In this paper we trace many such difficulties to our failure
to understand adequately the economics of software
development and use, and thus our failure to make software
and systems design decisions for products, processes,
programs and portfolios that that are demonstrably
consistent with the goal of maximizing value added.  We
discuss how a more sophisticated economic perspective on
software design promises to improve the productivity of
investments in software-intensive systems. We review the
state of the art in software economics.  We identify someimportant shortcomings in the existing work on software
economics.  We then provide a roadmap for future
research, and we discuss several current activities in that
context.
2 THE NEED FOR RESEARCH
Software Engineering Decision-Making Today
Guided largely by the principle of separation of concerns,
most software designers today make design decisions in an
economics-independent “Flatland,” where the focus is
largely on representation structure and logical semantics.
An analysis of sixteen books on software architecture and
object-oriented design, for example, showed that only two
included the word cost in the index.  More generally,
explicit links between technical issues and value creation
appear not to be central concerns of most software
engineers today.  One part of the problem is that these links
are not even understood very well in theory.
While software contributed primarily to off-line, backroom
activities, designing in this Flatland was not particularly
harmful.  That is no longer the case. Software design
decisions are now intimately coupled with fundamental
business, public service, and other decisions in almost
every field of endeavor.  It is now essential that we
understand how software design decisions relate to value
creation in a given context.
Consider the business context.  It is axiomatic in corporate
finance that a publicly held firm measures value in
monetary value in the marketplace, and that the primary
goal of management is to maximize present value,
incorporating expectations of future gains. Uncertainty,
incomplete knowledge, and competition pose major
challenges that demand intelligent investment strategies.
Such an enterprise can create value in severeal ways: first,
by producing or having options to produce benefits at a
profit greater than that of competitors; second, by
producing or having options to produce greater or different
benefits at equal cost. Software design decisions in a
business context must be linked to creating business value
in these terms.
Less well known perhaps is that non-business enterprises,
such as philanthropic foundations and universities, are also
driven by maximal value creation objectives. For example,
in “Philanthropy’s new agenda: creating value,” Porter and
Kramer argue, “The goals of philanthropy may be different,
but the underlying logic is still the same.  Instead of
competing in markets, foundations are in the business of
contributing to society by using scarce philanthropic
resources to their maximum potential.  A foundation
creates value when it achieves an equivalent social benefit
with fewer dollars or creates greater social benefit for
comparable cost” [59, p.126].  Similarly, in writing on
strategic philanthropy, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Pew Charitable Trust, says, “...trusts have
begun to think more like venture capitalists, seeking to
derive the greatest benefit from every strategic investment
of capital, time, and talent—except, in Pew’s case, the
return on investment is measured not in profits but in long-
lasting, positive, and powerful benefits to society” [64, pp.
230 – 231].
Software development involves costs, including time, talent
and money.  The benefits sought are measured in widely
varying terms.  Nevertheless, in all cases, the basic logic is
the same.  The goal is maximal value creation for a given
investment.  Understanding the relationships between
technical properties and the decisions that produce them, on
one hand, and value creation, on the other, is essential in
world in which software is so important to all aspects of
doing business or providing public services.
1 Software Engineering as a Value-Creation Activity
The core competency of software engineers is in making
technical software product and process design decisions.
Today, however, there is a “disconnect” between the
decision criteria that tend to guide software engineers and
the value creation criteria of organizations in which
software is developed. It is not that technical criteria, such
as information hiding architecture, documentation
standards, software reuse, and the need for mathematical
precision, are wrong.  On average, they are enormously
better than no sound criteria.
However, software engineers are usually not involved in or
often do not understand enterprise-level value creation
objectives. The connections between technical parameters
and value creation are understood vaguely, if at all. There is
rarely any real measurement or analysis of how software
engineering investments contribute to value creation.  And
senior management often does not understand success
criteria for software development or how investments at the
technical level can contribute fundamentally to value
creation.  As a result, technical criteria tend to be applied in
ways that in general are not connected to, and are thus
usually not optimal for, value creation.
Software designers, engineers, and managers must begin to
understand and reason effectively about the connections
between technical decisions and enterprise-level value
maximization.  Understanding these connections will drive
decision-makers at all levels to use better criteria, and to
make better choices.  One important adjustment is that
decision-makers begin to think more strategically. Getting
to this point requires that software specialists step out of
“Flatland” and away from purely technical criteria that are
not linked to enterprise-level value outcomes.  The first
step is to understand that the mismatch between the criteria
that are used today and ones more aligned with value
creation has several identifiable and remediable causes.
2 Sources of Technical-Value Mismatch
First, we lack adequate frameworks for modeling,
measuring and analyzing the connections between technicalproperties and decisions and value creation. Sullivan et al.
have argued, for example, that central concepts in software
engineering, such as information hiding [53], architecture
[72], the spiral model [9], and heuristics on the timing of
software design decisions, have yet to be linked adequately
to business value, but that such linkages can be made.  In
particular, Sullivan et al. have argued that linkages can be
established in terms of the real options value of the
decision flexibility afforded by modular designs and phased
project structures [76].
Consider phased project structures.  They create embedded
options to abandon or to redirect a project between phases,
and thus to respond to changing conditions and the ongoing
resolution of technical and market uncertainties.  Such
options can have significant value.  Understanding options
value can help inform project design because it can help the
designer to decide when investing in options adds value.
Given an embedded option, perhaps obtained through an
intentional investment, either holding it or exercising it can
also be optimal for value in some cases.  The failure to
cancel projects quickly that new information shows are
unlikely to succeed is a common example of not making a
value-optimizing decision.  The options view leads to a
dynamic management view of projects, including decisions
about whether and if so when to exercise options.
Another consequence of inadequately understood links is in
conflicts among decision-makers, often in the form of
arguments over whose technical criterion is better.  Without
links to value, there is little hope that such debates will
converge, or that the decisions best for value will be taken.
Second, most software designers and engineers are not
taught to reason about value creation as an objective or
about how technical parameters can be manipulated for
value creation purposes.  Rather, technical measures tend to
dominate pedagogy.  Such measures are necessary but
insufficient.
Third, the design space within which software designers
operate today is inadequate. By design space we mean the
set of technologies with which, and the organizational,
regulatory, tax, market and other structures within which,
software is developed and used.  Designers are unable to
make decisions that, if available, could significantly
increase the value created by software development and
use.  Of course powerful new technologies have great value
in improving software development productivity. However,
beyond technology, the overall economic environment has
shortcomings that need to be addressed. Examples include
the inability of many firms to account for software as a
capital investment; to access and exploit rich sets of third-
party components; and to buy and sell software risk in the
marketplace through warranties, insurance policies, and
similar instruments.
Why an Increased Emphasis on Software Economics?
These and related issues fall in the category of software
economics. The field of software economics is situated at
intersection of information economics and software design
and engineering.  Its basic concern is to improve the value
created by investments in software.  It seeks to better
understand relationships between economic objectives,
constraints, and conditions, on one hand, and technical
software issues, on the other, in order to improve value
creation at all levels: project, program, portfolio, enterprise,
industry, and national.
Software economics is not a new discipline, but there are
several reasons why it should receive increasing attention.
First, the end of the cold war, new technology, and
globalization of capital markets have fundamentally altered
the dynamics of technology innovation.  The center has
moved from large government projects to the commercial
sector, where different measures of value apply and
different dynamics exist, e.g., competition that makes time
to market a critical success factor.  Such factors must now
be treated explicit in design decision-making.
Second, the impacts of software-enabled change today
reach much further across and into organizations today than
in the past [79]. Many aspects of an enterprise now have to
be transformed for software-enabled change to create value.
One example is order fulfillment for electronic retailing.
Software systems are catalyzing great change, but complex
human-machine systems with software as just a component
must function for value to be created.  Focusing on value
creation demands a holistic perspective that considers all
investments that have to be made for software investments
to pay off. Without a holistic approach, inefficient
investment patterns are likely to continue.
Third, there is an increasing understanding in business,
philanthropy, government, and in most other major
organizations, that value creation is the final arbiter of
success for investments of scarce resources; and far greater
sophistication than in the past is now evident in the search
for value by the most effective organizations.  In particular,
there is a deeper understanding of the role of strategy in
creating value.  Strategic considerations dictate not only a
holistic approach, but one that treats uncertainty,
incomplete knowledge and competition in a sophisticated
manner.
1 New Sources of Value
Along with a new emphasis on value and strategy is an
increasing understanding that value is a complex, subtle
idea. Consider the sophisticated ways in which markets
value companies: not only for the profits that they might
produce based on their current configurations, but also for
strategic options that they have to reconfigure to exploit
potential future opportunities and synergies [81]. Good
strategists know that maximizing the value of an enterprise
often depends on investing to create real options andsynergies.  Increasingly strategy plays out in software
design.  Not for selling books at a profit has Jeff Bezos
been named Time Magazine’s 1999 Man of the Year.
The extraordinary market valuations of some internet
companies reflects an assessment of the present value of
uncertain future gains, including potential gains from the
exercise of real options.  The investment by Amazon.com
in an infrastructure and an initial foray into books, for
example, created not only a cash flow stream from book
sales, but real options to enter other markets.  The ability to
exercise those options quickly depends in part on the ability
to change the software on which the company runs,
supported, in turn, by the architecture and other technical
properties of the systems.
The “leap-frogging” of Intel and AMD in the race to keep
the world’s fastest microprocessor reflects the value of time
in that market.  The design processes have to be organized
in part to enable effective competition.  At a grander scale,
when firms are driven to compete in this way the resulting
increase in velocity of innovation and product range that
occurs has a tremendous impact on technology and the
economy.
Microsoft’s independent-feature-based architectural style
for many applications, combined with their synchronize-
and-stabilize process, creates real options to abandon
features late in development to meet time-to-market
requirements [23].  In selecting and integrating product and
process models, they are clearly doing so in a way that is
meant to create value in the form of decision flexibility.
An important goal of modern software economics is thus to
understand complex sources of value, and to clarify
connections between technical and economic dimensions,
including an explicit consideration of these higher-order
terms. Without an understanding of how to reason about
software design in these terms, it is unlikely that any
prescriptive theory of software design will be adequate to
the task of serving enterprise value-creation objectives as
effectively as possible.  Beyond the traditional issues of
cost and schedule, it is now becoming important to address,
in sound and systematic ways, such questions as whether
the value of a portfolio of real option created by a given
modular design is more than the cost of the investment in
architecture or process needed to obtain it; and, of the
possible portfolios corresponding to different
modularizations, which is worth the most.
2 New Measures of Value
A complicating factor is that although value often should
be measured in terms of money, this is not always true.
Non-profit enterprises value non-monetary results.  Some
have argued that the greatest and most enduring of profit-
making companies do not value money as the highest goal.
Rather, they treat money as a critical enabler for creating
value in other dimensions [20].
In some cases value is difficult to measure as a scalar
quantity. Consider cost and public safety.  These are two
dimensions of value for which there is no simple, linear
exchange formula.  At the extremes of safety, it might incur
tremendous costs to gain just a little more safety, a trade
that might be judged uneconomical given other ways of
using the same resources. Yet, when low on the safety
scale, a small cost increment might give a disproportionate
payoff in safety and be seen as very worthwhile [33].
In what dimensions and units is value measured?  How are
contingent future payoffs valued? What is the role of risk-
aversion in valuing contingent payoffs? How should one
reason about tradeoffs in multi-dimensional value spaces?
How does one reason about such valuations in the face of
uncertainty and incomplete knowledge.  How does
competition complicate models? A theory or practice of
software engineering based on value criteria has to
incorporate answers to these and many other related
questions.
Answers to some such questions have been developed,
mostly outside of the software engineering field. Decision
(utility) theory [61] provides a framework for decisions
under uncertainty in light of the risk aversion
characteristics of the decision-maker. The mathematics of
multi-objective decision-making has been addressed in
depth [39]. Smart Choices: A Practical Guide to Making
Better Decisions, is a good introduction for engineering
decision makers [34].
Classical corporate finance is an extensive framework for
making profit-oriented corporate investment decision-
making in the face of uncertainty. The book of Brealey and
Myers is a standard introduction [15].  Important topics
include net present value (NPV) as an investment decision
criterion; computing it by discounted cash flow analysis
(DCF); and optimal portfolio theory, or how to invest in a
portfolio of risky assets to maximize its return for a given
level of risk.  The NPV and DCF concepts are fundamental
in building business cases, in general.
Work on real options [2,24,80,81] addresses major, often
overlooked, shortcomings in DCF-based computations of
the NPV of investment opportunities. DCF treats assets
obtained by investing as passively held (like mortgages),
not actively managed (like projects or portfolios).  Yet,
management often has the flexibility to make changes to
real investments in light of new information. (e.g., to
abandon a project, enter a new market, etc.) The key idea is
to treat such flexibility as an option, and to see that in some
cases such real (as opposed to financial) options can be
priced using techniques related to those for financial (e.g.,
stock) options.
The fundamental advantage of the real options framework
over the traditional DCF framework is that the resulting
valuations incorporate the value added by making smartchoices over time.  Options pricing is not the only available
technique for valuing such decision flexibility.  Teisberg
presents perhaps the best available analysis of three key
valuation techniques: options pricing, utility theory and
dynamic discounted cash flow analysis.  She explains the
assumptions that each of these approaches requires as a
condition of applicability, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each [78].
The options pricing approach has two major advantages.
First, it relieves the decision-maker of having to forecast
cash flows and predict the probabilities of future states of
nature.  Second, it provides valuations that are based not on
such subjective, questionable parameter values, but rather
on data from the financial markets.  The details are beyond
the scope of this paper.  In a nutshell, the decision-maker
provides the current value of the asset under consideration
and the variance in that value over time.  That is enough to
determine the “cone of uncertainty” in the future value of
the asset, rooted at its current value and extending out over
time as a function of the volatility.
The variance is obtained by identifying assets in the
financial markets that are subject to the same risks as the
one in question.  A requirement for using this method for
valuing decision flexibility is that the risk (variance) in the
asset being considered be “in the span of the market,” i.e.,
that it be a function of the risks in identifiable traded assets.
The option to port a software system to a platform with an
uncertain future might be valued this way, because the risk
in the platform is arguably reflected in the behavior of the
stock price of the company selling the platform.  Because
the market has already priced that risk, it has implicitly
priced the risk in the asset under consideration, even if it is
not traded.  We get a market-calibrated price, rather than
one based on subjective guesses.  Much of the literature is
vague on the need for spanning to hold. Amram and
Kulatilaka provide a good introduction to this field [2].
The work of Baldwin and Clark is especially relevant.
They view Parnas’s information hiding modules [53] as
creating options, which they then value as options (without
depending on spanning).  On the basis of this insight, they
develop a theory of how modularity in design influenced
the evolution of the industry structure for computers over
the last forty years [6].  Sullivan et al., draw on this
material and the material discussed above to sketch a more
unified, options-based account of  the value in software
available through modularity, phased process models, and
either delaying or accelerating key design decisions [76].
3 The Need for Multi-Stakeholder Satisficing
The question of valuation is clearly difficult.  Another
complicating factor is who is doing the valuing? Is it a
company, a philanthropic foundation, a school or
university, a government research funding agency? What
does that person or entity value? Is it the likelihood of
financial gain, the solution of major societal problems, the
continuation of a valued culture, national security, or the
pleasure of learning or of designing things that work?
Even the question who is often not simple.  Any major
software design activity involves many participants, each
with its own goals and measures of value.  Even if they
agree on metrics—as in a coalition of profit-making
companies cooperating to make a profit—they have
conflicting interests in the distribution of gains.
Reconciling economic conflicts of this kind is a key
success factor in software development.  Reconciliation has
to be built into software processes, in particular.
A utilitarian view of this issue is possible.  For a system to
succeed in creating value for any one participant, it must
create value for all whose contributions are critical to
project success.  The failure to satisfy any one critical party
creates risks of compensatory actions that lead to a project
failure, thus to the satisfaction of none. Ensuring a credible
value proposition for each stakeholder at each point in time
is thus an essential part of design. In practice, each player
will carry a different amount and set of risks. Aligning
rewards to, and dependencies of a project on, any given
stakeholder has to account for their risks.
A non-utilitarian view of stakeholder reconciliation is also
possible. Collins et al., discuss an approach based on a
Rawlsian ethics of fairness [21,62].  The ideal is that the
stakeholders in a given situation negotiate an arrangement
under which each is treated fairly, where fairness is defined
by fairness axioms (e.g., never cause more harm to the least
advantaged stakeholder), and each player negotiates as if it
were unaware of its self-interest.  Collins et al. present a
fictional scenario involving a software provider, buyer,
users, and a “penumbra” of people who are affected by the
software.  The hospital is the buyer, the doctors, nurses and
others the users, and patients, who might be harmed by
wrong dosages, are the penumbra.
An analogous situation that is becoming quite visible at the
national policy level in the United States relates to private
ownership of critical civic infrastructures.  Most of these
systems have come to depend on software and information
systems in ways that most people never imagine [41,77].
There is great concern that many of these systems are no
longer adequately dependable, given both our increased
reliance on them and that they are now operating in
environments that are significantly more threatening than
those for which they were designed.  They have been
opened to manipulation through networks, outsourcing of
code development, and other means, and are vulnerable to
the growing capabilities of potential adversaries.  Is public
interest in the dependability of transportation and logistics,
banking and finance, energy production, transmission and
distribution, and other such infrastructures perfectly aligned
with the interests of the shareholders of the private firms
that own these infrastructures?Understanding how to integrate value considerations into
complex, software-intensive development processes is a
software design and engineering challenge, where software
design is construed in broad terms, to include public policy.
The stakeholder win-win concept and its integration into
the Win-Win Spiral Lifecycle Model [10] represent a
serious attempt at economics-driven software design.  The
design of this process model is clearly responsive to, and
indeed based on, a consideration of the economics of
complex software development processes.  It also provides
a way to embed Rawlsian ethical considerations into the
daily practice of software engineers [26].
From Win-Win, it is a relatively easy mental jump to
related models based on strategy in multi-player games.
Tit-for-Tat is an effective strategy, for example, in a two-
player, iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) context.  The IPD
is an abstract model that captures aspects of many business
interactions.  In this game, win-win occurs if each side
cooperates.  In this case, each makes a small gain.  Lose-
lose occurs if both sides defect.  The penalty to each side is
large.  The interesting part is that in win-lose, where one
side cooperates but the other defects, the winner gets a
large payoff, but the penalty to the loser is significant. Thus
there is a short term incentive to defect, but a long term
need for cooperation.
Value creation in this world depends on whether you’re
likely to encounter the other player for another round in the
future.  If not, defecting is a reasonable strategy.  If so,
cooperating is reasonable because cooperation is the only
strategy likely to produce consistent positive returns over
time. However, cooperating naively with a consistent
defector, e.g., one who takes your money but provides an
unreliable product, is clearly not optimal. Over time,
limited retaliatory defection—i.e., tit-for-tat—has been
found to be a highly competitive strategy.  It punishes
defections in a limited way to deter future defections but is
otherwise willing to cooperate [5]. Software design in a
world of dynamically assembled profit-making virtual
enterprises might well be subject to such economic
considerations, as might the design of automated agent-
based electronic commerce capabilities.
4 Future Trends Create Additional Challenges
Future trends will continue to exacerbate this situation. The
world is changing rapidly in ways that make the situation
ever more challenging.  While ever smaller, less costly
devices penetrate into the technology fabric, the World-
Wide Web and Internet have the potential to connect
everything with everything.  Autonomous agents making
deals in cyberspace will create a potential for chaos.
Systems of systems, networks of networks, and agents of
agents will create huge intellectual control problems.
Further, the economics of software development leave
system designers with no choice but to use large
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components in their
systems.  Developers have no way of knowing precisely
what is inside of these COTS components, and they usually
have very limited or no influence over their evolutionary
paths.
The PITAC Report accurately states [57, p.8] that “The IT
industry expends the bulk of its resources, both financial
and human, in rapidly bringing products to market.”  The
dizzying pace of change continues to increase.  Software
architecture and COTS decisions are made in great haste.
If you marry an IT architecture in haste, you no longer even
have the opportunity to repent at leisure.  Commercial
companies with minimal electronic commerce capabilities
must now adapt to e-commerce or die.
Of course, these trends also make this a time of fantastic
opportunity. The PITAC Report is “right on” in
emphasizing that IT offers us the potential to significantly
improve our quality of life by transforming the ways we
learn, work, communicate, and carry out commerce, health
care, research, and government.  Value creation
opportunities abound, but the path “from concept to cash”
[79] is becoming ever more treacherous.
A new focus on software economics is needed.  We now
discuss the history and the current status of software
economics, with the goal of understanding how it should
evolve to be better positioned to address important
emerging issues in software design.
History and Current Status of Software Economics
Software economics can be considered as a branch of
information economics, a subfield of economics which
began to receive serious treatment in the 1960’s.  Its
original subjects were such topics as the economics of
advertising and search for best prices [74], the economics
of investments in research and development [3], and the
economics of the overall knowledge industry [45].  A good
early comprehensive treatment of information economics is
Economic Theory of Teams [48].
The first comprehensive application to computing issues
was Sharpe’s The Economics of Computers [71].  It
covered such issues as choices between buying, leasing, or
renting computer systems; pricing computer services, and
economies of scale in computer systems.  It had a small
section on software costs, based largely on the first major
study of this topic, performed by System Development
Corporation (SDC) for the U.S. Air Force [52].
The SDC study formulated a linear regression model for
estimating software costs.  Although it was not very
accurate, it stimulated considerable research into better
forms for software cost models in the 1970’s and early
1980’s.  This resulted in a number of viable models still in
use today, such as SLIM [60], PRICE S [29], COCOMO
[8], SEER [37], Estimacs [66], and SPQR/Checkpoint [38].
Besides the COCOMO model, Software EngineeringEconomics [8] contained a summary of the major concepts
and techniques of microeconomics (production functions,
economies of scale, net value, marginal analysis, present
value, statistical decision theory), with examples and
techniques for applying them to software decision
situations.  Related contemporary works were the
monumental Data Processing Technology and Economics
[56], a detailed compendium of cost estimating
relationships and cost comparisons for computing
equipment and services (unfortunately with a short half-
life);  Computers and Profits [40], applying information-
economics techniques to computer-related decisions; and
The Economics of Computers:  Costs, Benefits, Policies
and Strategies [31], providing economic techniques for
managing computer centers and for related purchasing and
strategic-management decisions.
A number of mainstream software engineering techniques
implicitly embody economic considerations.  Software risk
management uses statistical decision theory principles to
address such questions as “how much (prototyping, testing,
formal verification, etc.) is enough?”  in terms of buying
information to reduce risk.  Spiral, iterative, and
evolutionary development models use risk and product
value considerations to sequence increments of capability.
The spiral model’s "Determine Objectives, Alternatives,
and Constraints" step [9] was adapted from RAND-style
treatments of defense economic analysis [35].
Parnas’s notion of design for change, is based on the
recognition that much of the total lifecycle cost of a system
is incurred in evolution, and that a system that is not
designed for evolution will incur tremendous cost [54].
However, the work focuses on modularity as a structural
issue, per se, more than on the weighing of lifecycle costs,
benefits and value creation.  The over-focus on structural
issues has carried through much of the more recent work on
software architecture [72].
Architecture and economics also play a large role in
dealing with software reuse.  Some good books in this are
[36,43,58,63].  Economics concepts of satisficing among
multi-stakeholder criteria and utility functions as articulated
in Simon’s The Sciences of the Artificial [73] have been
incorporated in software engineering approaches such as
Participatory Design, Joint Application Design, and
stakeholder win-win requirements engineering [11,17].
Shortcomings that Need to be Addressed
Currently, our ability to reason about software cost is
considerably stronger than our ability to reason about
software benefits, or about such benefit sources as
development cycle time, delivered quality, synergies
among concurrent and sequential projects, and real options,
including strategic opportunities.  The trends toward
software-based systems discussed above make it clear that
the ability to reason about both costs and benefits,
sometimes in sophisticated terms, and under such
difficulties as uncertainty, incomplete information, and
competition, will be a critical success factor for future
enterprises.
A good example is Rapid Application Development
(RAD).  As discussed above, the US PITAC Report [57]
accurately states that the information technology industry
focuses on rapidly bringing products to market.  However,
most software cost and schedule estimation models are
calibrated to a minimal cost strategy, which is not always
(and increasingly not) equivalent to a value maximization
strategy.  Each such approach has an estimation model
similar to a classic schedule estimation rule of thumb:
Calendar Months = 3 * 
3￿(Person-Months).
Thus, if one has a 27 person-month project, the most cost-
efficient schedule would be 3 * 
3￿(27) = 9 months, with an
average staff size of 3 people.  However, this model
captures only the direct cost of the resources required to
develop the project.  It completely fails to account for the
opportunity cost of delay in shipping a product into a
competitive marketplace, which is often decisive today.
A product in development can be viewed as a real option
on a market, like an option on a stock.  Shipping the
product to market is the analog of exercising the option.
The entry of a competitor into a market, taking away a
share of the cash flow stream that could otherwise be
exploited, is the analog of a sharp, discrete drop in the
stock price, i.e., of a dividend.  It is known that for stocks
that do not pay dividends, waiting to exercise is optimal.
however, waiting to own a stock that pays dividends, or to
enter a market that is subject to competitive entry, incurs an
opportunity cost: only the owner of the stock (or market
position) gets the dividend (profits).  Thus, dividends (or
the threats of competitive entry) create incentives to
exercise early.
Here we have a  rigorous economic explanation for time-to-
market pressure.  Understanding such issues is critical to
optimal software design decision making, where design
decisions include such decisions as that to “ship code.”
If time-to-market is critical, a solution more attractive than
that suggested by the rule of thumb above would involve an
average of 5.2 people for 5.2 months, or even 6 people for
4.5 months.  The earlier work assumes a non-competitive
environment, reflecting its orientation to government
contracts and classical batch-processing business systems.
The recent COCOMO II model [14] has an emerging
extension called CORADMO to support reasoning about
rapid schedules for smaller projects.
Not only are better software development estimation
models needed, but also they need to be integrated with
counterpart models in business operational mission
domains, in order to reason about tradeoffs between
software development time, function, quality, and theability to create value.  Of particular importance is the need
for work on software economics to move from static
notions of (uncertain) costs and benefits to dynamic and
strategic concepts of value creation through flexible
decision making under highly demanding circumstances
over time.  These needs are discussed further below.
3 SOFTWARE ECONOMICS ROADMAP
Our roadmap for the next major phase of research in
software economics begins with the goal of developing
fundamental knowledge that will enable significant,
measurable increase in the value created over time by
software and information technology projects, products,
portfolios and the industry.
Working backwards from the end objective, we identify a
network of important intermediate outcomes.  The roadmap
in Figure 1 illustrates these intermediate outcomes,
dependence relationships among them, and important
feedback paths by which models and analysis methods will
be improved over time.  The lower left part of the diagram
captures tactical concerns, such as improving cost
estimation for software projects, while the upper part
captures strategic concerns, such as reasoning about real
options and synergies between project and program
elements of larger portfolios.
Making Decisions that are Better for Value Creation
The goal of our roadmap is supported by a key intermediate
outcome: designers at all levels must make design decisions
that are better for value added than those they make today.
Design decisions are of the essence in product and process
design, the structure and dynamic management of larger
programs, the distribution of programs in a portfolio of
strategic initiatives, and to national software policy.  Better
decision-making is the key enabler of greater value added.
Design decision-making depends in turn on a set of other
advances.  First, the design space within which designers
operate needs to be sufficiently rich.  To some extent, the
design space is determined by the technology market
structure: what firms exist and what they produce.  That
structure is influenced, in turn, by a number of factors,
including but not limited to national-level strategic
decision-making, e.g., on long-term R&D investment
policy, on anti-trust, and so forth.  The market structure
determines the materials that are produced that designers
can then employ, and their properties.
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Figure 1: Roadmap for research in software engineering economics.Second, as a field we need to understand better the links
between technical design mechanisms (e.g., architecture),
context, and value creation, to enable both better education
and decision-making in any given situation. An improved
understanding of these links  depends on developing better
models of sources of value that are available to be exploited
by software designers in the first place (e.g., real options).
Third, people involved in decision-making have to be
educated in how to employ technical means more
effectively to create value.  In particular, they personally
need to have a better understanding of the sources of value
to be exploited and the links between technical decisions
and the capture of value.
Fourth, dynamic monitoring and control mechanisms are
needed to better guide decision-makers through the design
space in search of value added over time.  These
mechanisms have to be based on models of links between
technical design and value and on system-specific models
and databases that capture system status, valuation, risk,
and so on: not solely as functions of endogenous
parameters, such as software development cost drivers, but
also of any relevant exogenous parameters, such as the
price of memory, competitor behavior, macroeconomic
conditions, etc.
These system-specific models are based on better cost and
payoff models and estimation and tracking capabilities, at
the center of which is a business-case model for a given
project, program or portfolio.  We now discuss some of the
central elements of this roadmap in more detail.
Richer Design Spaces
The space in which software designers operate today is
inadequate.  One of the important reasons for this is that the
market structures within which software development
occurs are still primitive in comparison to those supporting
other industries. We are less able to build systems from
specialized, efficiently produced, volume-priced third-party
components than is possible in many other fields. We are
also less able to use markets to manage risk through
warranties, liability insurance, etc., than is common in most
fields.  The inability to manage risk by the use of market
mechanisms is a major hindrance to efficient production.
Links Between Technical Parameters and Value
Software design involves both technical and managerial
decisions.  The use of formal methods or the shape of an
architecture are technical issues.  The continuation or
reorientation of a program in light of new information is
managerial.  The two are not entirely separable.  The
selection of a life-cycle model is a technical decision about
the managerial framework for a system.  Moreover, even
where software engineering is concerned with technical
issues, the connection to value creation is what matters.
The promotion of Parnas’s concept of information hiding
modules, for example, is based on the following rationale:
most of the life-cycle cost of a software system is expended
in change [42].  For a system to create value, the cost of an
increment should be proportional to the benefits delivered;
but if a system has not been designed for change, the costs
will be disproportionate to the benefits [53]. Information
hiding modularity is a key to design for change.
Design for change is thus promoted as a value-maximizing
strategy provided one can anticipate changes correctly.
While this is a powerful heuristic, we lack adequate models
of the connections between this technical concept and value
creation under given circumstances.  What is the
relationship between information hiding modularity and
design interval?  Should one design for change if doing so
takes any additional time in an extremely competitive
marketplace in which speed to market is a make-or-break
issue?  Is information hiding obligatory if the opportunity
cost of delay might be enormous?  What is performance if
of the essence?  How does the payoff from changing the
system relate to the cost of enabling the change?  What role
does the timing of the change play?  What if it is not likely
to occur until far in the future?  What if the change cannot
be anticipated with certainty, but only with some degree of
likelihood?  What if the change is somewhat unlikely to be
needed but in the case that it is needed, the payoff would be
great [76]?  Value-optimal technical design choices
depends on many such factors.
Similarly, early advocates of the aggressive use of formal
methods promoted them on the grounds that software could
not be made adequately reliable using only informal and ad
hoc methods, but only through the use of formal methods.
Some thought that systems that could not be proven right
should not be built. The implied hypothesis (all too often
promoted as fact) was that using formal methods was
optimal for value, if only because value simply could not
be created, net of cost and risk, otherwise.
Subsequent experience has shown that hypothesis to have
been wildly incorrect. In particular, it has turned out to be
possible to create tremendous value without formal
methods. Some early advocates have admitted that and
pose interesting questions about why things turned out this
way.  One answer is that the assumed links were based on a
view of software products as relatively unchanging that
turned out not to be an accurate view.
We are not saying that formal methods cannot add value.
They obviously can in some circumstances: e.g., for high-
volume, unchanging artifacts, such as automotive steering-
gear firmware.  We still do not understand adequately the
economic parameters under which investments in the use of
formal methods create value. Recent work, e.g., of Praxis,
Inc., is improving our understanding.  Serious attempts to
support limited but significant formal methods in industrial,
object-oriented design modeling frameworks, such the
Catalysis variant of UML [25], should provide additional
information over time.Links Between Software Economics and Policy
Understanding technology-to-value links is critical to
making smart choices, not only at the tactical project level,
but also in strategic policy-making: e.g., in deciding
whether to promote certain results as having demonstrated
value, and in selecting research activities having significant
potential to achieve long-term, strategic value creation
objectives. Whereas software engineering is about making
smart choices about the use of software product and
process technologies to create value, software engineering
research policy is about making smart choices about how to
change the software engineering design space to enable
greater value creation over time.
The question of who decides precisely what form of value
research is to seek, and what value the public is getting for
its investment in research and development, is a deep
question in public policy.  Without trying to answer it fully,
we summarize some current trends and provide a
framework for software research and development
investment policy research.
The prevailing definition of the value to be created by
public investment in research has changed in significant
ways over the last decade.  That change is one of the
factors that demands that greater attention now be paid to
software economics. During the Cold War and prior to the
globalization of commerce and the explosion of advanced
technology development in the commercial sector, the
nation’s R&D investments were driven largely by national
security concerns.  Value creation meant contributing to
that mission.  Today, many argue, the concern has shifted
dramatically to economic competitiveness. R&D
investments in pre-competitive technologies are meant to
pay off in design space changes that enable industries to
create and societies to capture greater economic value.
In the United States, a major strategic emphasis has been
put on new public investment in R&D in information
technology, with software, broadly construed, as a top
priority.  This emphasis is justified on several grounds.
First, society is coming to rely on systems that depend on
fragile, unreliable, and insecure software. Second, our
ability to produce software that is both powerful and easy
enough to use to create value is inadequate.  Third, our
capacity to produce the amount of software needed by
industry is inadequate.  There are thus two basic
dimensions of value in the calls for new public investments
in software R&D: public welfare, and economic prosperity.
Realizing value in these dimensions is as much a concern
of the public as profit is for shareholders.
Software R&D Investment Policy Research Framework
At the level of corporate and national strategic software
R&D investment policy, the question, then, is what
portfolio of investments—in larger programs and individual
projects—is needed to deliver the returns desired over time
at selected risk levels? (Risk is a measure of the variance
on future returns viewed as a random variable.)  The
returns will occur in short, intermediate, and long time-
frames.  How can a portfolio be managed for maximal
value creation in the indicated dimensions?  How can the
return on resources investment be evaluated?  Should
individual projects be evaluated for success or failure?
Individual projects are risky.  There is often too little
information to value them precisely.  Rather, funding a
project can be seen as producing an option to make a
follow-on investment in the next stage, contingent on
success. Over time, as research generates new information,
the option value fluctuates.  At the end of the phase a
decision is made on whether to exercise the option to invest
in the next phase. Declining to invest is not a signal that the
researcher failed or that the initial investment was
misguided, only that in light of current information, it
would not be optimal to invest in the next phase.
The staged investment approach permits concepts to be
dropped or changed if they turn out not to work, or to be
promoted through increasing levels of commitment. The
corporation or society benefit when a transition to
profitable production is made and where aggregate profits
more than compensate for the investment in the research
portfolio.
It is critical that individual research efforts not be judged as
a matter of policy—prospectively or retrospectively—in
terms of potential or actual contribution to value realized
by the society or corporation.  That would drive all research
to the short term.  The return-on-investment calculation
should occur at the program and portfolio level.  For
example, foundation funding for what was seen at the time
as far-out research in biology catalyzed the green
revolution.  The program ran about fifteen years.  Not every
project within such a program succeeds, nor do most
successful projects directly ameliorate hunger.  Rather,
successful projects contribute to a complex of intermediate
results that lead to end results that, when transitioned into
production, ultimately produce the benefits for society.
The return is weighed against the investment in the overall
program.
For basic research in software it is similarly essential to
insist that individual projects not be evaluated solely in
terms of actual or potential direct payoff to society or
business.  At the same time, one must insist that strategic
programs show payoffs over sufficiently long time frames.
Individual projects can be evaluated prospectively or in
terms of their potential to contributed intermediate results
that could further a strategic program, and retrospectively
in terms of whether they did so.  One must be determined
to redirect or abandon software research programs if they
do not deliver realized benefits to a corporation or society
over sufficient periods.  Software economics thus includes
the economics of investments in creating new knowledge
about how to produce software.Finally, strategy is multi-dimensional.  Realizing the
benefits of investments in the creation of knowledge
through basic research is unlikely if too few people are
taught about it.  The education of software and information
technology designers who occupy technical and business
positions will play a significant role in realizing economic
benefits of research in software, in general, and of research
in software economics, in particular.  Garnering the
benefits of better design spaces and software technologies
and investment models depends on knowledgeable
professional experts using them effectively.
Better Monitoring & Control for Dynamic Investment
Management
Software-intensive systems design generally occurs in a
situation of uncertainty and limited knowledge.  Designers
are confronted with uncertainties about competitors,
technology development, properties of products, macro-
economic conditions, the status of larger projects within
which a given activity is embedded.  Conditions change
and new information is gained continuously.  The benefits
that were envisioned at the beginning of such a project
often turn out to be not the ones that are ultimately realized,
nor are the paths by which such activities progress the ones
that were planned.  Complex projects take complex paths.
The search for value in spaces that are at best only partially
known is necessarily dynamic if it is to be most effective.
Beyond a better understanding of software design as a
decision-making process, a better design space in which to
operate, a better understanding of the context-dependent
linkages between technical properties and value creation,
and better educated decision-makers, software designers
need mechanisms to help them navigate complex situations
in a manner dynamically responsive to new information
and changing conditions.  We need models for both the
systems being developed and for decision processes that
support dynamic monitoring and control of complex
software development activities.  Dynamic management of
investment in the face of significant uncertainties and gaps
in knowledge is critical at levels from the single project to
corporate and national software R&D investment policy.
Multiple models of several kinds will be used at once in
any complex program.   Models will be needed to guide
and to support monitoring and control in the areas of
product (e.g., architecture, verification), process (e.g.,
overall lifecycle), property (e.g., dependability), costs (e.g.,
for staff, materials, overhead),  risk (e.g., lawsuits, liability
judgements, failure due to technical or managerial
difficulties), opportunities (e.g., to improve a product, to
extend it to exploit new markets or other sources of value,
or to follow with a synergistic new function), major
programs (e.g., the dependencies among projects that
determine ultimate success), corporate or national
portfolios (constituent projects and how they support
strategic objectives), uncertainty (e.g., project risks within
programs and co-variance properties), markets (resources,
needs, competition), etc.
Models at all of these levels are relevant to technical
software design decision-making.  Product architectural
design decisions, for example, are critical to determining
strategic opportunities and in mitigating technical and other
risks. Such models and associated dynamic decision
processes should be developed, integrated into software
design activities, and related to our existing software design
decision criteria.  To enable the use of such models in
practice, tool and environment support will often be
needed.
4 IMPROVING SOFTWARE ECONOMICS
WITHIN AN ENTERPRISE
The lower portion of the roadmap in Figure 1
summarizes a closed-loop feedback process for improving
software economics within an enterprise.  It involves using
better data to produce better estimates of the likely costs
and benefits involved in creating, sustaining, and
employing a portfolio of software and information
technology assets.  These estimates can be used to initiate a
dynamic management process in which progress toward
achieving benefits is tracked with respect to expenditure of
costs, and corrective action is applied when shortfalls or
new opportunities arise.  This tracking also results in more
relevant and up-to-date data for improving the cost and
benefit estimation models for use in the next round of the
firm’s initiatives. In this section, we discuss three key
components of this process:  modeling costs, benefits, and
value; tracking and managing for value; and design for
lifecycle value.
Modeling Costs, Benefits, and Value
1 Modeling Software Development Cost, Schedule, and
Quality
In Section 2 we discussed several software cost estimation
models, and indicated that each had at least passed a market
test for value by remaining economically viable over at
least a decade.  Their relative accuracy remains a difficult
question to answer, as data on software cost, schedule, and
quality is far from uniformly defined.  A significant step
forward was made with the core software metric definitions
developed in [67], but there is still about a ±15% range of
variation between projects and organizations due to the
counting rules for data.  Example sources of variation are
the job classifications considered to be directly charging to
a software project, the way an organization counts
overtime, and the rules for distinguishing a defect from a
feature.This has led to a situation in which models calibrated to a
single organization’s consistently collected data are more
accurate than general-purpose cost-schedule-quality
estimation models.  Some particularly good examples of
this in the software quality and reliability estimation area
have been AT&T/Lucent [50], IBM [18], Hewlett Packard
[32], the NASA/CSC/University of Maryland Software
Engineering Lab [49], and Advanced Information Services
[28].
The proliferation of new processes and new technologies is
another source of variation that limits the predictive
accuracy of estimation models.  For example, it required
161 carefully-collected data points for the calibration of
COCOMO II [14] to reach the same level of predictive
accuracy (within 30% of the actuals, 75% of the time) that
was reached by the original COCOMO model [19] with 63
carefully-collected Waterfall-model data points [8].
Alternative estimation approaches have been developed,
such as expertise-based, dynamics-based, case-based, and
neural net models; see [13] for further details.  Neural net
and case-based models are still relatively immature.
Dynamic models are particularly good for reasoning about
development schedule and about adaptation to in-process
change [1,44], but are hard to calibrate.  Expertise-based
methods are good for addressing new or rapidly changing
situations, but are inefficient for performing extensive
tradeoff or sensitivity analyses.  All of the approaches share
the difficulties of coping with imprecise data and with
changing technologies and processes.
2 The Elusive Nature of Software Estimation Accuracy
In principle, one would expect that an organization could
converge uniformly toward perfection in understanding its
software applications and accurately estimating their cost,
schedule, and quality.  However, as the organization better
understands its applications, it is also able to develop better
software development methods and technology.  This is
good for productivity and quality, but it makes the previous
estimation models somewhat obsolete. This phenomenon is
summarized in Figure 2.
As an organization’s applications become more
precedented, its productivity increases and its estimation
error decreases.  However, at some point, its domain
knowledge will be sufficient to develop and apply reusable
components.  These will enable a significant new boost in
productivity, but will also increase estimation error until
the estimation models have enough data to be recalibrated
to the new situation.  As indicated in Figure 2, a similar
scenario plays itself out as increased domain understanding
enables the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
components and very high level languages (VHLL).  A
further estimation challenge arises when the organization
becomes sufficiently mature to develop systems of systems
which may have evolved within different domains.
3 Modeling Benefits and Value
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Figure 2. Productivity and Estimation Accuracy Trendsscale in Figure 2.   Measuring software productivity has
been a difficult and controversial topic for a long time.
Great debates have been held on whether source lines of
code or function points are better for measuring
productivity per person-month.  Basically, if your
organization has the option of  developing software at
different language levels (assembly language, 3GL, 4GL),
function points will be preferable for measuring
productivity gains, as they are insensitive to the extra work
required to produce the same product in a lower-level
language. (However, for the same reason, source lines of
code will be preferable for estimating software costs.)  If
your organization develops all its software at the same
language level, either is equally effective.
However, it is not clear that either size measure is a good
proxy for bottom-line organizational productivity.  One
problem is behavioral, and can be summarized in the
acronym WYMIWYG (what you measure is what you get).
In a classic experiment, Weinberg gave the same
programming assignment to several individuals, and asked
each to optimize a different characteristic (completion
speed, number of source statements, amount of memory
used, program clarity, and output clarity).  Each individual
finished first (or in one case, tied for first) on the
characteristic they were asked to optimize [82].  The
individual asked to optimize completion speed did so, but
finished last in program clarity, fourth out of five in
number of statements and memory used, and third in output
clarity.  A thorough treatment of this and other risks of
“measurement dysfunction” is provided in [4].
The second problem is that it is not clear that program size
in any dimension is a good proxy for organizational
productivity or value added.  The popular design heuristic
KISS (keep it simple, stupid) would certainly indicate
otherwise in many situations.  This leads us again to the
challenge of modeling the benefits and value of creating a
software product.
In contrast to methods for modeling software costs,
effective methods for modeling software benefits tend to be
highly domain-specific.  The benefits of fast response time
will be both modeled and valued differently between a
stock exchange, an automobile factory, and a farm, just
because of the differences in time value of information in
the three domains.
4 General Benefit-Modeling Techniques
However, there are more general techniques for modeling
the contribution of a software product to an organization’s
benefits.  These frequently take the form of a causal chain
linking the organization’s goals and objectives to the
development or acquisition of software.  Examples are
Quality Function Deployment [27], Goal-Question-Metric
[7], and the military Strategy-to-Task approach.
A significant recent advance in this area is the Results
Chain used in the DMR Benefits Realization Approach
(DMR-BRA) [79].  As shown in Figure 3, it establishes a
framework linking Initiatives which consume resources
(e.g., implement a new order entry system for sales) to
Contributions (not delivered systems, but their effects on
existing operations) and Outcomes, which may lead either
to further contributions or to added value (e.g., increased
sales).  A particularly important contribution of the Results
Chain is the link to Assumptions, which condition the
realization of the Outcomes.  Thus, in Figure 3, if order to
delivery time turns out not to be an important buying
criterion for the product being sold, the reduced time to
deliver the product will not result in increased sales.
This framework is valuable not only for evaluating the net
value or return on investment of alternative initiatives, but
also in tracking the progress both in delivering systems and
contributions, and in satisfying the assumptions and
realizing desired value.  We will return to the Benefits
Realization Approach below.
5 Modeling Value: Relating Benefits to Costs
In some cases, where benefits are measured in terms of cost
avoidance and the situation is not highly dynamic, one can
effectively apply net present value techniques.  A good
example in the software domain deals with investments in
software product lines and reusable components.  Several
useful models of software reuse economics have been
developed, including effects of present value [22] and also
reusable component half-life [46].  An excellent
compendium of economic factors in software reuse is [58].
Even with software reuse, however, the primary value
realized may not be in cost avoidance but rather in reduced
time to market, in which case the value model must account
for the differential benefit flows of earlier or later market
penetration.  Some organizations in established competitive
marketplaces (e.g., telecommunications products) have
quite sophisticated (and generally proprietary) models of
the sensitivity of market share to time of market
introduction.  In other domains, such as entrepreneurial
new ventures, models relating market share to time of
market introduction are generally more difficult to
formulate.
Another major challenge in modeling costs, benefits, and
value is the need to deal with uncertainty and risk.
Example sources of uncertainty are market demand, need
priorities of critical stakeholders or early adopters, price,
macro-economic conditions (e.g., shrinking markets in Asia
or Latin America), technology unknowns, competitor
unknowns, and supply scarcities.  These uncertainties have
spawned an additional sector of the economy which
performs consumer surveys, market projections, technology
evaluations, etc., and sells them to organizations willing to
buy information to reduce risk.Tracking and Managing for Value
A good indicator of the current status and trends in models
for software project tracking and managing is provided by
the related key practices in the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) Capability Maturity Model for software
Version 1.1 [68,55], and in the recent draft CMM-
Integrated-Systems/Software Engineering  (CMMI-SE/SW)
Version 0.2b [69].
In the software CMM Version 1.1, the basic Key Process
Area, situated at Level 2, is called Software Project
Tracking and Oversight.  It has 13 Activities-Performed
elements, which include tracking to and updating a
documented plan; reviewing and controlling commitments;
tracking and taking necessary corrective actions with
respect to software size, effort, cost, computer resources,
schedule, and risks; recording data; and performing formal
and periodic internal project reviews.
This framework is a sound implementation of the
fundamental project management feedback process of
monitoring progress and resource expenditures with respect
to plans; and of performing corrective actions, including
appropriate plan revisions, where necessary.  It is relatively
advanced with respect to risk management.  However, it is
very narrowly focused on the software artifacts to be
produced, and not much on their contribution to achieving
benefits or organizational goals.
The corresponding Level 2 process in the CMMI-SE/SW is
called Project Monitoring and Control.  Its implementation
of the fundamental project management feedback process is
roughly the same, including the emphasis on risk
management, which is also a separate Process Area in the
CMMI-SE/SW.  It is more system-oriented, in that the
product and task attributes to be monitored and controlled
include such attributes as size, complexity, weight, form,
fit, and function.  However, except for possible broad
interpretations of “form, fit, and function,” it is also very
narrowly focused on the artifacts to be produced, and not
much on their contribution to achieving benefits or
organizational goals.
Both the software CMM and the CMMI-SE/SW have Level
4 Process Areas which relate more to customer and
organizational needs and goals.  Both use a relatively
advanced definition of “quality” with respect to such
traditional measures of software quality as delivered defect
density.  In the software CMM, a primary activity involves
understanding the quality needs of the organization,
customer, and user, exemplified by the use of surveys and
product evaluations.  In the CMMI-SE/SW, particular
quality needs are additionally exemplified such as
functionality, reliability, maintainability, usability, cycle
time, predictability, timeliness, and accuracy.  The CMMI
also emphasizes traceability to not only to requirements but
also to business objectives, customer discussions,  and
market surveys.
Again, these are quite advanced in their focus on customer
needs and business objectives, but their primary focus
remains on tracking and managing the execution of the
project rather than on the value it will presumably deliver.
Concepts such as a business case which validates the
economic feasibility of the project, and which serves as a
basis for tracking the continuing validity of assumptions
underlying the project’s business case are not explicitly
mentioned.  In practice, the usual “earned value” system
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the project tasks to be performed as the value to be earned,
rather than  the expected business value associated with the
product’s operational implementation.
Opportunities for Improvement
In the context of our previous discussions of value creation
via information technology, the current normative tracking
and managing practices as exemplified by the CMM’s
leave open a number of opportunities for improvement.
These include improvements in the nature of the
achievements to be monitored and controlled, and
improvements in the nature of the corrective actions to be
performed in case of shortfalls in the projected
achievements.
Improvements in the nature of the achievements to be
monitored and controlled have been discussed in the
context of dynamic investment management in Section 3,
and will be discussed further in Section 5.  A particularly
attractive initial improvement to address is the application
of business-value concepts to traditional earned value
systems. One approach would be to use the project's
business case analysis as the basis of accumulating
projected business value, rather than (or in addition to) the
current measure of  success in terms of task-achievement
based value.
Improvements in the nature of corrective actions can
involve reorganization of the project's process and the
system's architecture to best support adaptation to dynamic
business objectives.  If an entrepreneurial startup's primary
objective, for example, is to demonstrate a competitive
agent-based electronic commerce system at COMDEX in 9
months, the driving constraint is the inflexible date of
COMDEX in 9 months.
An appropriate reorganization of the process and
architecture involves using a Schedule as Independent
Variable (SAIV) process model, in which product features
are dropped in order to meet the 9-month schedule.  This
requires two additional key steps.  One is to continuously
update the priorities of the features, so that no time is lost
in deciding what to drop.  The other is to organize the
architecture to make it easy to drop the lower-priority
features.  Attempting to succeed at SAIV without having
provided these necessary preconditions for successful
corrective action has compromised the success of a number
of entrepreneurial startups.
Design for Lifecycle Value
Developing a software system or portfolio of systems is an
ongoing activity of design decision-making that extends
across multiple organizational and product granularity
levels and through time.  The software economics
viewpoint on this activity has two basic parts. Foremost is
that the objective of software design is to create surplus
value.  The goal is not to achieve verifiability, evolvability,
safety, quality, usability, reusability, reliability, satisfaction
of a formal specification, possession of a mathematical
semantics, or any other technical property, per se.
Technical properties are of course critical to creating value,
but they are the means, not the ends. The guiding objective
for software engineering is design for value added.
The second part of the economics viewpoint tries to answer
the question, How does one do design for value?  One key
answer is that one should treat software development as an
investment activity, and look for real improvements by
modeling, analyzing, and managing it as such.  We take
active investment management as a central part of an
approach to achieving value creation objective.  By active
investment management we mean structuring a mix of
products, processes, projects, and portfolios, and
operational targets to enable ongoing creation and
exploitation of favorable investment opportunities, of
synergies among concurrent projects, and of synergies
among sequential projects.
Much work has been done in economics—especially
finance—to develop tools for reasoning about value
creation through intelligent, dynamic investment decision-
making. Relevant issues include how present and future
costs and benefits are made commensurable; how risk and
risk tolerance can be characterized, measured, managed and
factored into valuations; how present value can be created
in the form of exposure to opportunities for future gain and
protection against down-side risks; how efficient capital
structures that promote speed and variety in innovation can
be fostered; and so on.
At the same time, the software engineering field has pushed
our understanding of relationships between product and
process structure and value in the face of complexity,
uncertainty, and competition—albeit in an ad hoc and
informal manner. Some of the seminal work in software
engineering has been picked up by finance researchers.
Recent research on economic drivers of the evolution of the
computer industry, for example, point to information hiding
modularity as embodied in open architectures as being
fundamental [6]. It is thus natural for software engineering
researchers to seek out analogies and correspondences
between investment concepts and software design in an
attempt to leverage knowledge from finance to improve
productivity in the software domain.
1 Value-Driven Design
While the finance concepts of cost and benefit are well
known, a sophisticated economic perspective raises issues
that are not typically addressed adequately in software
development projects today. Advances are possible when a
more sophisticated economic viewpoint leads to the
consideration of complex sources of value, and the means
by which value creation can be improved.  By exploiting
modern finance concepts, software engineers can develop a
better understanding of such issues as the following:• the present value of future payoffs that might or might
not be attained
• the value of new information that reduces uncertainty
about unknown states of nature
• the value of risk reduction with all other factors,
including expected payoffs, the same
• the present value of options whose payoffs depend on
how exogenous uncertainties are resolved, including
options to enter new markets if market conditions
become favorable; to make follow-on investments if
exploratory phases produce favorable results; to
abandon money-losing investments for abandonment
payoffs; to ship a product early or just to be able to
make a credible threat of doing so
• how desired risk-return characteristics can be attained
through diversified portfolios of assets, provided that
the assets have somewhat independent returns
• the nonlinear value of networks in their size [70].
• the opportunity cost of investing early in the face of
uncertainty, and of investing late in the face of possible
drops in asset values, as might result from competitive
entry into a market
If these concepts are to be exploited by software engineers,
then it is important to relate them to terms and decision
criteria that software engineers understand.  Important
software engineering decision-making heuristics include
the following:
• information hiding modularity
• architecture first development
• incremental software development
• always having a working system
• risk-based spiral development models
• the value of delaying design decisions
• components and product-line architectures
Modularity and architecture, in particular, have strategic
value in establishing valuable options: to improve a system
one part at a time as new or revised parts are delivered; to
create variants to address new or changed markets; and to
develop variants quickly.  Phased project structures, as
promoted especially by the spiral development model and
its variants, create valuable options in the form of
intermediate decision points.  It’s far less costly to abandon
a relationship before becoming engaged than after, before
getting married than after, before having children than
after.  The value maximizing decision is to cut one’s losses
early as soon as it is clear that a project is not going to
succeed.  A culture that legitimizes abandonment as a
potentially value-creating alternative is better than one that
makes abandonment difficult by equating it with failure.
Relating software design concepts to value-based analogs
opens up considerations that have significant potential to
inform software development, especially in the strategic
dimension. Rather than thinking of design as an
anticipatory activity that succeeds if one anticipates
correctly and that fails if not, for example, one can reason
about the increased present value of a design that has
flexibility to accommodate changes that might or might not
occur. The designer succeeds if the value of the system is
increased (net of cost and risk) by the decision to include
flexibility that has a clear although uncertain potential to
produce a future payoff.
2 Investing in the Anticipation of Change
Although the distinction is subtle, it is important.  Among
other things, it emphasizes the need for the designer to
manage the ever-changing valuations of the elements of a
software development portfolio to optimize for value.  If an
“anticipated” change does not occur, then the value of the
system decreases because the flexibility no longer holds the
potential for a future payoff.  The value of the system
decreases because of the change in external circumstances.
When such a change is significant enough, the design
situation in the small or even in the large might need to be
reconsidered.  The ongoing valuation of one’s assets, the
monitoring of conditions that affect those valuations, and
adjustments in the asset mix and operational objectives are
the keys to an active investment management approach to
software design decision-making.
At the corporate level, this view puts a premium on
investments that enable designers to better anticipate
change.  Examples are evaluation of emerging technologies
(CORBA, COM, object management systems, agent
management systems), and product usage trend analysis.
Of course, there is no silver bullet.  Software design is and
will continue to be an exceedingly demanding activity.
Although financial concepts of value and management for
value added can contribute to software design, they are no
panacea.  The complexity of the activity ensures that there
is no simple formula.  Many factors have to be brought
together at once for software or software-enabled systems
to deliver the benefits that, net of their costs, produce a
surplus that is then distributed among the stakeholders to
make everyone better off.  Complexity ensures that there
are many ways that things can go wrong to undercut the
attainment of benefits.  Ensuring that all of the required
factors are aligned will remain a challenge of the first
order.
5 EMERGING VALUE-DRIVEN DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES
The second key issue with respect to optimizing for value,
then, is to understand the entire set of conditions that mustoccur together for benefits to be realized. Timely and
economical production of a product having the properties
needed to satisfy a need is of the essence, of course. What
sets of conditions must be orchestrated for the successful
delivery of a value-creating product?  What failure modes
threaten such an efforts?  Design approaches now emerging
from industry and from academic research laboratories are
beginning to tackle these question head-on, with an
emphasis on the value creation through a comprehensive
approach to ensuring the realization of defined benefits.
Two such efforts are Model-Based (System) Architecting
and Software Engineering (MBASE) [12] and the “benefits
realization” approach of Thorp and DMR Consulting [79].
The focus of each is on achieving all of the conditions
necessary for defined benefits to be realized.  We discuss
each approach in turn.  We compare and contrast them with
each other.  Then we put them in the broader context of
active investment management.  We then discuss what
some of the challenges might be in reorganizing existing
enterprises to follow such approaches.
MBASE/USC
The Model Based (System) Architecting and Software
Engineering (MBASE) approach [12] is driven by the view
that a narrow focus on technical aspects of system
architecture is far from enough to promote successful
outcomes.  Instead, the approach advocates a holistic
treatment of all of the key issues, in four basic dimensions,
that must be addressed for success to occur.
The product dimension addresses issues such as domain
model, architecture, requirements, and code. The process
dimension involves tasks, activities, and milestones.  The
property dimension involves cost, schedule, and
performance properties.  The success dimension addresses
what each stakeholder needs, e.g., in terms of business
cases, satisfaction of legal requirements, or in less formal
terms. The basic idea is that in each of the dimensions,
activities and expectations are guided by models, and that
these models must be mutually consistent for a project to
succeed.
The central axiom of the MBASE approach is that success
depends on the contributions of multiple self-interested
parties—stakeholders—and that for the required set of
contributions to materialize,  all stakeholders must be
satisfied that the process will satisfy their success criteria. It
becomes critical to understand the success models of each
success-critical stakeholder and to manage the activity to
sustain each stakeholder’s expectation of success.
Recognizing conflicts among success models, reconciling
them, and managing expectations emerge as key
challenges.
More generally, the approach recognizes that one of the key
sources of problems in complex projects is in the
misalignment or incompatibility of models.  The approach
thus emphasizes the need to bring the models into harmony
so that they reinforce each other.  Stakeholder success
models along with application domain models drive
choices of property, process and product models. The
approach provides guidance for identifying and resolving
conflicts, and heuristics for promoting the coherence of the
multiple models. As clashes among success criteria are
resolved, for example, the consistent set of criteria are
embodied in product models, e.g., in the system
specification.
The next important concept is that the elaboration of a
harmonious set of models cannot occur either sequentially
or in a single “big bang.” Things change and people cannot
foresee all issues that will arise in a complex development
effort.  The MBASE approach thus emphasizes the use of
an approach in which models are elaborated and made ever
more mutually reinforcing over time in an iterative fashion.
The Win-Win spiral model is employed in an attempt to
ensure that the ultimate objectives—each stakeholder’s
desire for the satisfaction of its success criteria—is
continually accounted for in the evolving set of models.  As
conditions evolve, success criteria, requirements, processes,
and other model elements are adjusted in an attempt to keep
the effort on track.
The MBASE approach recognizes that conditions change
and that early visions might or might not succeed.  Thus it
incorporates as a key element in the iterative development
process a three major anchor point milestones: life cycle
objectives (LCO), life cycle architecture (LCA), and initial
operational capability (IOC). These milestones represent
fundamental stakeholder life cycle commitment points
analogous to the real-life commitment points of getting
engaged, getting married, and having your first child. The
Anchor Point milestones define constituent elements and
associated reviews and pass/fail conditions. LCO and LCA
include as essential content an Operational Concept
Definition, Requirements Definition, Architecture
Definition, Life Cycle Plan, Key Prototypes, and Feasibility
Rationale, Architecture Review Board reviews and their
Feasibility Rationale-based pass-fail criteria.  The IOC
milestone addresses the deliverables for software,
personnel, and facility preparation, and it includes a
Transition Readiness Review, a Release Readiness Review,
and their associated pass-fail criteria.
The final MBASE core invariant is that the design and
content of MBASE artifacts and activities should be driven
by considerations of risk management. The rationale is that
the risk criterion is the best way for a project to determine
the adequacy of specifying, prototyping, reusing, testing,
documenting, reviewing, and so on. The failure to apply
this criterion increases the risk that a project will not
achieve critical success conditions and the risk that effort
will be wasted on unnecessary or dysfunctional activities.DMR/Thorp
Thorp traces the evolution of the application of information
technology from automation of routine work, through
information management to its primary role today: enabling
profound transformations in business structures and
functions.  His primary thesis is that the expected benefits
of  information technology generally are not being realized
today because (1) realizing the benefits of information-
technology-enabled business transformation can require
coordinated change across an entire organization, not just
the installation of new information technology components;
and (2) managers continue to behave as if they were still in
the old world of work automation or information
management, when simply installing computers and
software was perhaps adequate to realize benefits.
In particular, Thorp emphasizes the need for manager to
consider four key issues.  The first is the linkages between
information technology investments and business strategy
on one hand and, on the other, changes needed elsewhere in
the organization (e.g., training) that are required to realize
benefits.  The second is reach: the extent to which an IT-
enabled change impacts on the organization, both in the
range of business units and functions affected and in the
depth of changes required.  Understanding and managing
the impacts of such changes, e.g., on involved stakeholders,
is seen to be critical.  The third issue is people: that many
people must commit to a given transformational change,
and that can require significant engineering of attitudes, etc.
The fourth issue is time: that the time frame within which a
change is made is critical to success, but hard to predict in
advance, and it is not infinitely flexible, as organizations
can absorb change at a finite rate.  Thorp also emphasizes
that the parameters in these dimensions will themselves
change over time.
The Thorp/DMR benefits realization approach is based on
several premises: first, technology alone is insufficient to
produce benefits; second, early visions of benefits are
rarely realized, but rather the benefits that are ultimately
achieved are based on a dynamic, somewhat unpredictable
process of benefits pursuit over time; and third, realizing
benefits requires a continuous process of envisioning the
benefits desired, implementing, and dynamically adjusting
course in light of new information.
The first point drives a change in perspective from
traditional engineering, based on a cycle of design-develop-
test-deliver, to an end-to-end view of technology-intensive
development: from concept to cash.  The approach is
holistic and focused on realizing value, rather than just on
technical issues.  It recognizes that the strategic value of
information technology is increasing exponentially, but that
as its impacts cut deeper and ever more broadly across
organizations, and as the costs of information technology
continue to drop, the fraction of the cost of IT-enabled
change attributable to IT itself continues to dwindle.
At an investment structuring level, the Thorp/DMR
approach is based on several concepts.  The first is that the
emphasis has to shift from stand-alone projects, for which
the goal is the delivery of a discrete capability (e.g., a
software system), to multi-project programs, for which the
goal is to produce benefits at the organizational level.  A
project might deliver a computer, but it takes a program to
put a person on the moon.
The second idea is that an organization should take a
disciplined approach to designing portfolios of programs in
order to realize given benefits while managing risk and
return.  The programs in these portfolios, as suggested
above, will combine investments in information technology
with other initiatives as necessary to achieve defined
business objectives.
The third core concept is that a full cycle governance
approach be taken to managing the portfolio and its
constituent programs.  This idea combines active, full life
cycle management with the notion of a phased and
incremental investment approach based on well defined
stage gates.  Stage gates are major evaluation and decision
points for programs that enable reevaluation of changes in
the state of a program and its environment, and decisions
about whether to change course, e.g., to abandon, redirect,
or reinforce a program.
In terms of management, per se, the Thorp/DMR approach
requires what he calls activist accountability, relevant
measurement, and proactive management of change.
Activist accountability means that a senior business
manager owns each program and is accountable for the
realization of its benefits.  An important corollary is that
the information technology group cannot reasonably be
held accountable for realizing business benefits of IT-
enabled change. It does not have the ability or authority and
scope of control to coordinate all of the elements needed to
realize benefits at the organizational level; so it must not be
given such responsibility, either.
The measurement issue stresses that the tracking of
performance parameters related not just to costs but to
benefits is critical.  Costs are tangible; performance
measures that reflect the realization of benefits are harder
to find.
The third issue is proactive management of change.  This
issue goes to the question of implementing a benefits
realization approach or any of the major IT-enabled
changes within it, in an organization not already set up for
such changes.  Senior leadership is seen to be essential is
managing change across the dimensions of linkages, reach,
people and time.
Synthesis
The MBASE and Thorp/DMR approaches overlap
considerably in the concerns that they address.  First andforemost, both take a holistic view of design,
acknowledging that many factors at once have to be
addressed for design investments to pay off.  They both
take phased approaches to scaling up commitments only as
they scale down risks.  They achieve this outcome through
phased investment structures with defined milestones.  The
DMR approach emphasizes strategy, risk engineering, and
the creation and management of synergies and real options
more strongly than MBASE.  On the other hand, MBASE
is significantly stronger in addressing particular issues that
arise in the context of complex software components of
software-intensive system projects.
6 RESEARCH CHALLENGES
A broad set of research challenges is arising in software
economics. First, software economics has always addressed
important problems, but the major economic discontinuities
created by software and information technology itself are
now pushing software economics to the top of the research
agenda.  Second, the problems are of real scientific and
technological—not just economic—interest.  Design
activities are in some sense guided by “force fields” [6].
The proper force field for guiding software engineering, as
for any utilitarian design and engineering discipline, is
value creation, measured in terms that count for the
enterprise that is investing resources. A science of design,
which is, after all, what we seek as a basis for software
engineering, will have to account for the influence of that
field.  Third, the practical significance of advances, or of
the failure to make them, is high.  Fourth, it appears
possible to make significant progress through a
comprehensive program in research and education in
software economics.
A research program will include several elements.  At the
highest level, we need to learn how to think about and
manage software development as an investment activity, the
goal of which is to create maximum value  for the resources
invested.  Reasoning about how to manage investment to
maximize value is becoming very sophisticated, and many
kinds of enterprises, including philanthropic foundations,
are borrowing from the advances that are being made.  As
Brooks observed in regard to software, it is easier to buy
than to build.  Perhaps that is also true for important
concepts and structures for organizing complex investment
activities.  In other words, there might be much to gained
by borrowing from other fields and by adapting existing
knowledge to the software context.
Software development is a complex activity, so it should
not be astonishing to find that significant adaptation is
necessary in some cases.  Other fields, such as finance and
strategy, can help to inform software design.  In return,
software design and engineering can inform other fields.
Baldwin and Clarke, in developing a theory of the
evolution of the computer industry, in particular, appeal
directly to the information hiding notion.
In particular, the role of strategy in value creation is now
much better understood and appreciated than it was thirty
years ago.  Strategy involves coordinated and dynamically
managed investments in multiple, interrelated areas with
specific value creation objectives. It is now understood that
much of the present value of some enterprises is in the form
of options that they hold to profit from possible future
opportunities [51], and that a fundamental strategy for
increasing value is to invest in the creation of such options
and in the capabilities necessary to exercise them.
Capabilities extend all the way to culture.  An enterprise
can do better than its competitors, for example, if its culture
accepts project abandonment in light of unfavorable new
information as a positive-value action.
Beyond the management activities of any individual
enterprise, there is the larger question of how best to
improve the design space in which they operate.
Traditional software engineering research plays a vital role
in enabling new and better technologies and processes; but
innovative research on what is necessary to achieve a
transformation of the industry structure is also needed.
Understanding how to create more liquid markets in
software risk is one potentially important step.
Within the enterprise, there are interesting questions about
how best to allocate scarce resources at the “micro” level.
Many activities contribute to the development of a software
product.  They all compete for resources.  The value added
is a complex function of the distribution of resources over
those activities.  Getting a sense of what that function is,
both overall, and for particular life-cycle activity, such as
verification, is important.  Of course, the function will vary
from one context to another, just as cost functions do.
To support all of these activities, new models and
associated analysis methods are needed for reasoning about
the value of investments in software technical assets,
including design aspects of software processes, products,
projects, programs and portfolios.  Supporting tools and
environments will then be needed to make the models
useful to engineers in practice.
Finally, understanding how to integrate such advances into
industrial software development processes is essential to
realizing the benefits enabled by such research.  It is not
enough to produce disembodied models.  Recent advances
represented in the MBASE and DMR approaches provide
indications that we are now at a stage where we can
envision achieving such an integration.
7 EDUCATION
Finally, we note, briefly, that the research cannot have the
desired impact without a coordinated investment in
education.  At a minimum, a traditional course in
engineering economics would help to give software
engineers a rudimentary background in finance. Other
engineering disciplines consider engineering economics tobe an essential part of their respective bodies of knowledge.
Recent attempts to define bodies of knowledge and related
curricula for software engineering, by contrast, under-
emphasize software engineering economics.  For example,
it might be treated within a course on software engineering
management, typically in the form of attention to cost,
schedule and risk estimation and management.
Such treatments would further delay the benefits to be
gained from a holistic treatment of economics throughout
the body of knowledge.  Rather than presenting information
hiding as an independent concept (it makes software easier
to change in ways that you anticipate), it could also be
justified in economic terms.  Not every concept in software
engineering succumbs directly to an economic analysis, of
course.  Giving students a visceral understanding of how to
design for value in the face of uncertainty, incomplete
knowledge and competition through clever product, process
and portfolio design is a significant challenge that is not
likely to be met by a curriculum that separates economic
thinking from design and other aspects of development, and
that leaves the treatment of economics with traditional cost
and schedule estimation models and risk management
concepts.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The software field exists because processed information
has value.  If people were not willing to pay for software
development in the expectation of enhanced value, all of us
in the software field would be out of jobs.
Given that we live in and benefit from this value-
determined situation, it is in our enlightened self-interest to
increase our understanding of and our ability to deal with
the economic aspects of software, its development, and use.
The results chain of initiatives, contributions, and outcomes
in Figure 1 is indeed a roadmap for how we can progress
from our current barely-coping stage of software
economics mastery to a world in which more informed
software and information technology decisions lead to
much greater value creation and quality of life for all of us.
However, as with other results chains, we must be careful
to ensure that the assumptions underlying the achievement
of the outcomes are valid.  The biggest assumption
underlying the roadmap in Figure 1 is that there are
enough people with a sufficient understanding of both
software and economic phenomena to enable the
contributions and outcomes to be realized.
As we have discussed, one step in this direction is to enable
more software people to emerge from an economics-
unaware logical Flatland and better deal with the economic
aspects of software.  But this is not enough.  There are also
many people living in other Flatlands, in which they may
do well at marketing or finance, but have an insufficient
understanding of software phenomenology to function well
at creating value via software.
By improving and propagating our understanding of
software phenomenology and its economic aspects, we can
evolve to where we can all live in a fully-dimensional
world spanning software and economic phenomenology,
and advance our abilities to generate value via information
technology many-fold.
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